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Abstract 
In recent years there has been a spate of pa­
pers describing systems for probabilisitic rea­
soning which do not use numerical probabil­
ities. In some cases the simple set of val­
ues used by these systems make it impossible 
to predict how a probability will change or 
which hypothesis is most likely given certain 
evidence. This paper concentrates on such 
situations, and suggests a number of ways in 
which they may be resolved by refining the 
representation. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years there has been considerable in­
terest in qualitative approaches to reasoning under 
uncertainty-approaches which do not make use of 
precise numerical values of the type used by conven­
tional probability theory. These approaches range 
from systems of argumentation (Benferhat, Dubois, & 
Prade 1993; Darwiche 1993; Fox, Krause, & Ambler 
1992) to systems for nonmonotonic reasoning (Gold­
szmidt 1992) and abstractions of precise quantitative 
systems (Druzdzel & Henrion 1993; Wellman 1990). 
Qualitative abstractions of probabilistic networks, in 
particular, have proved popular, finding use in areas 
in which the full numerical formalism is neither nec­
essary nor appropriate. Applications have been re­
ported in explanation (Henrion & Druzdzel 1990), di­
agnosis (Darwiche & Goldszmidt 1994; Henrion et al. 
1994), engineering design (Michelena 1991), and plan­
ning (Wellman 1990). 
In qualitative probabilistic networks (QPNs), the fo­
cus is rather different from that of ordinary probabilis­
tic systems. W hereas in probabilistic networks (Pearl 
. • Current address: Department of Electronic Engineer­
mg, Queen Mary and Westfield College, Mile End Road, 
London El 4NS, UK 
1988) the main goal is to establish the probabilities of 
hypotheses when particular observations are made, in 
qualitative systems the main aim is to establish how 
values change rather than what the values are. Since 
the approach is qualitative, the size of the changes 
are not required. The only consideration is whether a 
given change is positive, written as (+J, negative [-J, 
or zero [0]. In some cases it is not possible to resolve 
the change with any precision so that its value remains 
unknown, and it is written as [?]. Clearly this infor­
mation is rather weak, but as the applications show 
it is sufficient for some tasks. Furthermore, reasoning 
with qualitative probabilities is much more efficient 
than reasoning with precise probabilities, since compu­
tation is quadratic in the size of the network (Druzdzel 
& Henrion 1993), rather than NP-hard (Cooper 1990). 
The popularity of qualitative probabilistic networks 
prompted work on abstractions of other uncertainty 
handling formalisms (Parsons 1995b; 1995a; Parsons & 
Mamdani 1993), providing what is essentially a gener­
alisation of the approach provided by qualitative prob­
abilistic networks (Wellman 1993) to what are termed 
qualitative certainty networks (QCNs). The approach 
uses techniques from qualitative reasoning (Bobrow 
1984) to determine the behaviour of the formalisms. 
Using this approach it is possible to propagate qual­
itative probability, possibility (Dubois & Prade 1988; 
Zadeh 1978) and Dempster-Shafer belief {Shafer 1976) 
in a uniform way. 
There are two major problems with both qualitative 
probabilistic and certainty networks, which are related 
to their level of abstraction. The first is that they 
cannot always predict which of a pair of hypotheses is 
most likely given certain evidence. The second is that 
if a particular hypothesis is influenced by two pieces of 
evidence, one of which makes it more likely and one of 
which makes it less likely, then if both are observed, it 
is not possible to tell what the change in probability of 
the hypothesis is. This paper gives a number of ways 
in which this problem may be tackled. 
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2 BASIC NOTIONS 
Both QPNs and QCNs are built around the notion of 
influences between variables represented by nodes in a 
graph. In this section we introduce the basic notions 
behind both, and show how, in the binary case, they 
are equivalent so that the results given later in the pa­
per hold equally for both approaches. The description 
of a QPN is that given by Druzdzel and Henrion (1993) 
and is marginally adapted to fit in with the notation of 
QCNs. Formally, a QPN is a pair G = (V, Q), where V 
is a set of variables or nodes in the graph, denoted by 
capital letters, and Q is a set of qualitative relations 
among the variables. There are two types of qualita­
tive relations in Q, influences and synergies, but here 
we are only interested in influences. These define the 
sign of the direct influence between variables and cor­
respond to arcs in a probabilistic network. 
Definition 1 (qualitative influence) We say that 
A positively influences C, written sf+l (A, C), iff for 
all values a1 > a2, c0, and X, which is the set of all 
of C 's predecessors other than A: 
where ai and Cj are the possible values of A and C. 
This definition expresses the fact that increasing the 
value of A makes higher values of C more probable. 
Negative qualitative influence, sf-l, and zero qualita­
tive influence, S[a], are defined analogously by substi­
tuting ::; and = respectively for 2:· To allow belief 
propagation it is necessary to propagate qualitative 
changes in value in both directions. This is made pos­
sible by the following theorem (Milgrom 1981): 
Theorem 2 (symmetry of influences) Sf6l(A, C) 
implies sfoJ ( C, A). 
The impact of evidence on a given node can be calcu­
lated by taking the sign of the change in probability 
at the evidence node and multiplying it by the sign 
of every link in the sequence of links that connect it 
to the node of interest. To see how this works, con­
sider the example in Figure 1 which is an adaptation 
of fragment of the car diagnosis network of Henrion et 
al. (1994). If we observe that the radio is dead, so 
that the probability of the radio being ok decreases, 
p(radio ok) = [-], and we want to know the impact of 
this on the state of the battery we calculate the effect 
as[-]®[+]®[+]. With the definition of sign multipli­
cation in Table 1 this gives a change in p(battery good) 
of [-]. If we also observed that the lights were not ok, 
and wanted to assess the impact of both pieces of ev­
idence on the probability that the battery was good, 
we would establish the two individual effects and sum 
battery 
old 
battery 
good 
radio 
ok 
alternator 
ok 
battery 
charging 
lights 
ok 
Figure 1: Part of a car diagnosis network 
them using EB (Table 2). QCNs are very similar, the 
main differences being that they are abstractions of 
possibilistic and Dempster-Shafer belief networks as 
Table 1: Sign multiplication. 
Sign addition. 
+ 
[0] [-] [?) 
[-] [-] (?) 
[?) [?) [?) 
well as probabilistic networks, and that, in general, 
the qualitative influences between variables need more 
than one sign to define them. Formally, a QCN is a 
pair G = ( V, Q), where V is a set of variables or nodes 
in the graph, once again represented by a capital let­
ter, and Q is a set of sets of qualitative relations among 
the values of the variables. The qualitative relations 
are based upon the derivatives that relate the differ­
ent values of the variables together. In the case of a 
probabilistic QCN we have: 
Definition 3 (qualitative derivative) The qualita­
tive derivative [:;f��)] relating the probability ofC tak­
ing value c1 to the probability of A taking value a1 has 
the value[+], if, for all a2 and X: 
Derivatives with values (-] and [0] are defined by re­
placing 2: with ::; and =. The similarity of Defini­
tions 1 and 3 means that it is no surprise to find that 
the propagation of qualitative changes in the value of 
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variables is once again performed using® and Ef). If we 
write the qualitative value of the change in probability 
of variable A taking value a1 as [Llp(a1)] then: 
and the overall effect of multiple changes is calculated 
using Ef). Now, a link in a QCN is normally specified by 
a number of qualitative values-one for each relevant 
derivative, which means one for every pair of values, 
one from each variable, of the two variables joined by 
the link-while, as stated above a link in a QPN is 
completely specified by a single value. This means 
that despite their similarities the two methods differ 
in their representation of the same information. How­
ever, when we have a binary probabilistic link, things 
are rather simpler. In this case, the condition on the 
derivative relating p(c) to p(a) being [+] is: 
p(c I a, X) ?: p(c 1-.a, X) 
which means that if [�%t�lJ = [+] it is necessarily the 
case that L��c�)] = [ -] and, furthermore the rela­
tion between p(c) and p(-.c) makes it necessary that 
[d!)(:VJ = [-] and [�;(��)] = [+). These derivatives 
express exactly the same as a positive qualitative in­
fluence between binary valued A and C (if a> -.a and 
c >-.c)-as a becomes more probable, c becomes more 
probable as well. It is also the case that in this binary 
case [�;?�D = [�l:n so that links are symmetric. 
The upshot of this is that binary probabilistic QCNs 
are equivalent to binary QPNs, and their links can be 
summarised by a single qualitative value which is the 
qualitative derivative relating the "true" values of the 
links that the node connects. Thus, by investigating 
binary probabilistic QCNs we simultaneously develop 
results applicable to work involving QPNs, and this 
is what will be undertaken in the rest of this paper, 
refering to both systems simultaneously as QP/CNs. 
Consider the QP/CN in Figure 2 which gives some in­
formation about illness and employment. If I become 
ill it is more likely than before that I will lose my job 
and more likely that I will have to go to hospital. In 
addition, if it is discovered that I am not qualified, it 
becomes more likely that I will lose my job. However, 
regular exercise makes it more likely that I will be fit, 
and staying fit makes it less likely that I will end up in 
hospital. Consider further that it is known that I am 
ill. Propagating the effect of this information in our 
QP/CN tells us that both ending up in hospital and los­
ing my job become more likely since both hypotheses 
have value[+]. Thus it is not clear which is most likely. 
Distinguishing which of these competing hypotheses is 
more likely is the first problem that we will address 
lose job 
Figure 2: Some recent events (I). 
in this paper. Also consider what happens if I both 
become ill and exercise-the first makes hospital more 
likely, the second makes it less likely. Propagation of 
the effects of both these peices of information in the 
QP/CN yields a value of [?] for the change in probabil­
ity of the hypothesis so that we cannot say how it will 
change. This problem of competing influences is the 
second point we will address. 
3 DISTINGUISHING TRUTH 
The problem that we face is one of over-abstraction, 
and it is one well known in qualitative physics. One of 
the methods used to handle it is the use of landmarks 
(Bobrow 1984), that is distinguishing important values 
of variables and calculating changes relative to them. 
Currently QP/CNs handle links that cause a change in 
the descendant when the parent changes. If we dis­
tinguish 1 and 0, which are the obvious landmarks for 
probability theory, we can also distinguish increases to 
1, decreases to 0, and links in which the change in the 
descendent is to a value of 1 or 0. More formally we 
denote an increase to 1 as (f], a decrease to zero as 
[±], and introduce a new kind of qualitative influence 
based on the absolute value of the conditionals: 
Definition 4 (categorical influence) We say that 
A positively categorically influences C, written g[++] 
(A,C), ifffor all X, p(cla,X) = 1. 
which it is easy to see will ensure that p(c I a) = 1 
so that whenever p(a) increases to 1, p(c) increases 
to 1. We can similarly define an negative categor­
ical influence g[--] (A, C) which ensures that when­
ever p( a) increases to 1, p( c) decreases to 0 by making 
p(c I a, X) = 0. Clearly neither of these types of in­
fluence is symmetric since, for instance, the fact that 
p(c) is 1 whenever p(a) is 1 does not mean that p(a) is 
1 whenever p(c) is 1. Thus a categorical influence be­
tween A and C does not imply a categorical influence 
between C and A. In order to propagate values with 
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lose job 
exerczse 
Figure 3: Some recent events (II). 
the new influences we need to extend the definition of 
@ to that in Table 3. 
Table 3: New sign multiplication. 
@ [++] [+] (0] [-] [--] [?] 
rfl [t] [+] [0] [-] [jJ [?] 
[+] [+] [+] (0] [-] [-] [?] 
[0] [0] [0] [OJ [o] [0] [0] 
[-] [-] [-] (0] [+] [+] (?] 
[±l [-] [-] (0] [+] [+] [?] 
[?] [?] [?) (0] [?] (?] (?] 
This is sufficient to solve the problem of competing hy­
potheses in the special case that one of the hypotheses 
is connected to an observed event by a chain of cat­
egorical influences. For example, consider Figure 3 
in which the representation of my recent history is up­
dated to make it more realistic. Here, when it is known 
that I am ill, we find that !:ip(hospital) = [+], while 
tip (lose job) = rfJ' so that we know that it is at least 
as likely that I will lose my job as it is that I will have 
to go to hospital. 
To combine categorical and qualitative influences, we 
need to define a new version of Ef). Initially it might 
seem as though we have 16 possible cases to consider­
every possible combination of the two types of influ­
ence. However, two are ruled out by the restrictive 
probability distribution that comes with a categorical 
influence: 
Property 5 (restricted representation) If there is 
an influence s[++l (A, C) then there can be no influence 
S[- -] (X, C) and vice-versa. 
Proof: For s[++l(A,C) we require p(c I a,X) = 1 
and thus p(c I a ,  x) = 1. For sr--l(x, C) we require 
p(c I x, A) = 0 and thus p(c I x ,a) = 0. These re­
quirements are clearly contradictory, and so the two 
influences may not occur together.D 
exercise 
lose job 
Figure 4: Some recent events (III) 
As a result there is no way that changes to 1 and 0 can 
conflict since the influences that cause them cannot 
affect the same node. This reduces the possible cases 
of conflict between the influences, and all the legal 
combinations of induced change in the probability of 
a node are given in Table 4. With this table we can 
solve the problem of conflicting influences. Consider 
the version of recent events according to my mother 
(Figure 4) who believes that as soon as I became ill, it 
was inevitable that I would end up in hospital. Thus, 
for her, knowing that I was ill immediately outweighed 
all the hard work I had put in taking exercise, and 
/).p( hospital) = [t]. 
However, landmarks do not solve every problem. It 
is easy to imagine real situations in which conflicting 
evidence will cause a problem for QP/CNs which are 
free of categorical influences. In qualitative reasoning 
circles the realised inadequacy of landmarks led to the 
development of 'order of magnitude' techniques, and 
these are what we propose to apply next. 
Table 4: New sign addition 
EB [t] [+] [0] [-] [.).] [?] 
[t] [t] [t] [t] [t] [?] 
[+] m [+] [+] [?] [:!:] [?] 
[OJ m [+] [0] [-] [±] [?] 
[-] m [?] [-] [-] [:!:] [?] 
[±l [±] [±] [±] [:!:] [?] 
[?] [?] [?] [?] [?] [?] [_?] 
4 RELATIVE MAGNITUDES 
The problem of conflicting evidence is precisely the 
sort of problem that order of magnitude systems such 
as ROM[K] (Dague 1993) were designed to overcome. 
ROM[K] is based on the idea that the order of magni­
tude of two quantities, Q1 and Q2, is usually expressed 
in terms of their relative sizes. Within ROM(K] there 
are four possible ways of expressing this relation: Q1 
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(Al) 
(A2) 
(A3) 
(A4) 
(A5) 
(A6) 
(A7) 
(A8) 
(P3) 
(P26) 
A�A 
A�B-?B�A 
A�B,B�C-7A�C 
A""B-7B"'A 
A,.... B, B ""C -7 A"' C 
A�B-7A"'B 
A � B -7 C.A � C.B 
A "' B -7 C.A "' C.B 
A « B -7 C.A « C.B 
A"'B-7B"'A 
(A9) 
{AlO) 
(All) 
(A12) 
(A13) 
(A14) 
(A15) 
(P35) 
{P36) 
(P38) 
A "" 1 -7 [A] = (+] 
A« B ++ B � (B +A) 
A«B,B""C-?A«C 
A� B, [C] [AJ -7 (A+ C)� (B +C) 
A ""B, [G] [A] -7 (A+ C)"' (B +C) 
A"" (A+ A) 
A '/:- B ++ (A-B) "' A or (B -A) "' B 
A '/:- B -7 C.A '/:- C.B 
A'/:- B, C «A -7 C «(A- B) 
A'/:- B, C �A, D � B -7 C '/:- D 
Figure 5: Some of the axioms and properties of ROM[K] 
is negligible wrt Q2, Q1 « Q2, Q1 is distant from Q2, 
Ql '/:- Q2, Q1 is comparable to Q2, Q1 "' Q2, and Ql 
is close to Q2, Q1 � Q2• Once the relation between 
pairs of quantities is specified, it is possible to deduce 
new relations by applying the axioms and properties 
of ROM[K], some of which are reproduced in Figure 5. 
Together, these relations, axioms, and properties en­
able us to solve our on-going problems of competing 
influences and hypotheses by further refining the lan­
guage of QP/CNs. To do this we must start deal­
ing with the magnitude of the probabilities and in­
fluences. We denote the magnitude of the change in 
the probability of A as j.6.p(A)I, and the magnitude of 
the influence between A and C as JS(A, C) I, and ex­
press their relative magnitudes using the relations of 
ROM[K], noting that again symmetry is lost so that 
relations change between causal and evidential direc­
tions. Then, provided that we have a QP/CN in which 
the relative magnitude of the influences is known, we 
can apply the rules in Figure 5 to establish the relative 
sizes of changes at nodes of interest. Thus: 
Property 6 (relative magnitude) Given jS(A, C)j 
reh jS(B, D)l, and J.6.p(A)j reh J.6.p{B)j, where reh, 
reb E {�, ........ , '/:-, «}, then j.6.p(C)I rels /.6-p(D)I is 
given by Table 5 and the obvious symmetrical results. 
Proof: The change at C is jAp(A)j · JS(A, C) I, and 
likewise for that at D. Thus we need the rela­
tive magnitude of the products. {i) For jAp(A) I « 
1.6-p(B)j and jS(A, C) I« JS(B, D) I, the result comes 
from P3 and Pll. (ii) For j.6.p(A)I « j.6.p(B)I and 
jS(A, C) I '/:- !S(B, D)\, we apply P3, P35 and P36 to 
get /.6-p(A)!·IS(B, D)I+IAp(B)I·!S(A, C)l « jAp(B)I· 
IS(B, D) I. Since we already know (from P3) that 
jAp(A)I· IS(A, C)!« j.6.p(A)l·lS(B, D) I, this gives us 
lAp(A)I . IS(A, C) I+ lAp( B) I· IS(A, C)l « 1.6-p(B)l . 
lS(B, D) I from which the result follows. (iii) For 
1.6-p(A)I « jAp(B)I and IS( A, C)!"' IS(B, D)f, the re­
sult comes from A8, All and P3. (iv) For /.6-p(A)I « 
j.6.p(B)j and jS(A,C)j � IS(B,D)I, the result comes 
from A6, A7, All and P3. (v) For jAp(A)I '/:- j.6.p(B)I 
and !S(A, C) I 'f. IS(B, D) I, the result comes from the 
fact that 'f. is deliberately not transitive so that no 
relation between the products can be established. (vi) 
For jAp(A)I ¢ !.6-p(B)I and IS( A, C) I ,___ jS(B, D) I, 
we have the same explanation. (vii) For j.6.p(A)I '1:­
jAp(B)I and jS(A, C) I � lS(B, D) I, the result comes 
from A7, P35 and P38. (viii) For 1.6-p(A)I"' j.6.p(B)I 
and IS( A, C) I "' IS(B, D)!, the result comes from A8 
and A5. (ix) For j.6.p(A)!"" !.6-p(B)I and !S(A, C) I� 
IS(B, D) I, the result comes from A5, A6, A7 and A8. 
All other results may be obtained by symmetry 0. 
Table 5: How to establish rel3 (Property 6)-U indi­
cates that the relation may not be established. 
reb 
� "' � «: 
reh � � ""' :/!. «: 
""' 
""' ""' u « 
:/!. :/!. u u «: 
«: «: « « « 
This result allows us to do two things. F irstly, it en­
ables us to propagate the effect of evidence in a QP/CN 
so that we can distinguish which of several compet­
ing hypotheses is most strongly supported by given 
evidence. Consider Figure 6 which gives another ver­
sion of recent events, and ponder what happens when 
I lose my job. The influence of losing the job on 
being ill is much smaller than the influence of los­
ing the job on not being qualified, S(lose job, ill) « 
S(lose job, not qualified), and since j.6.p(lose job)i � 
j.6.p(lose job)! we can use Property 6 with reh as« 
and reb as � to find that rela must be «. Thus 
j.6.p(ill)l « j.6.p(not qualified)!, and we know that the 
change in p(ill) is much less than p(not qualified). 
Secondly Property 6 allows us to establish the effect of 
two competing pieces of information. If B influences 
C rather than D, then the relation given by Table 5 is 
that between the change in p( c) induced by the change 
in p( a), and that induced by the change in p(b). W hen 
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lose job 
S(lose job, ill) � S(lose job, not qualified) 
S(stay fit, hospital)� S(ill, hospital) 
Figure 6: Some recent events (IV) 
the influences compete the changes are in opposite di­
rections, and immediately we have: 
Property 7 (comparison) If we have JS(A, C)jrel1 
JS(B, D)J, and J�p(A)J reb J�p(B)J, where rel1, reb E 
{�, ...... , �, «}, and JS(A, C)J and JS(B, D) I have oppo­
site signs, then [�p(C)] is given by Table 5 and the 
obvious symmetrical results. 
Table 6: How to establish the sign of the change at C 
(Property 7). 
reb 
::::::: rv '/! � 
reh ::::::: [?) [?) [�p(B)] [�p(B)] 
rv [?] [?] [?] [�p(B)] 
1!. [�p(B)] [?) [?] f����j� � [�p(B)i [�p(B)] [�p(B)] �P B] 
To see how this property may be used, consider Fig­
ure 6 once again. Given that the influence of be­
ing ill on going to hospital is much greater than 
the influence of staying fit on not going to hospi­
tal (JS(stay fit, hospital) I « JS(ill, hospital) I), and 
that there is a roughly equal increase in the proba­
bility of my staying fit (due to knowledge of my ex­
ercising) and being ill (J�p(stay fit)J ::::::: J�p(ill)J) 
we can predict that there is an increase in the prob­
ability of my going to hospital when I become ill 
( [�p(hospital)] = [�p( ill)]) . 
Thus using ROM[K] allows us to solve the problem 
of competing influences in any situation where rela­
tive magnitude information is available-clearly many 
more situations than possess categorical links-and 
so improves on the results obtained by distinguishing 
truth. However, ROM[K] does not have enough nu­
merical information to fully distinguish between com­
peting hypotheses, only being able to predict which 
hypothesis undergoes the greatest change in probabil-
ity. To tell which hypothesis becomes most likely when 
influences are not categorical we must turn to absolute 
order of magnitude methods. 
5 ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDES 
A suitable method for absolute order of magnitude rea­
soning, which revolves around the propagation of in­
terval probability values, is discussed by Dubois et al. 
( 1992) in the context of quantified syllogistic reason­
ing. In this section we adapt it to fit QP/CNs. We 
start by identifying suitable interval values for both 
influences between nodes, changes at nodes, and the 
values at nodes. Here we use a very basic set for rea­
sons of brevity-more complex sets could be used if 
desired-and provide each with a label. The label of 
an interval is merely a means of referring to it, there is 
no claim that it is a natural linguistic interpretation of 
the interval. For the influences we have intervals cor­
responding to 'Strongly Positive' (SP), 'Weakly Posi­
tive' (W P), 'Zero' (Z), 'Weakly Negative' (W N) and 
'Strongly Negative' (SN): 
SP 
(1, o:] 
WP 
[o:, 0) 
z 
0 
WN 
(0, -o:] 
SN 
[-o:, -1) 
where the open intervals explicitly do not allow the 
modelling of categorical influences. Note that, once 
again, these influences are not symmetrical. For both 
changes and values we have 'Complete Positive' ( C P), 
'Big Positive' (BP), 'Medium Positive' (M P), 'Little 
Positive' (LP) and 'Zero' (Z): 
CP 
1 
BP 
(1,1- ,8] 
MP 
[1- ,8, ,8] 
LP 
[,8, 0) 
z 
0 
The definitions of 'Little Negative' (LN), 'Medium 
Negative' (M N), 'Big Negative' (BN) and 'Complete 
Negative' (CN) are symmetrical. When propagating 
absolute order of magnitude quantities, we multiply 
change by influence to get Table 7 The ?s in this ta-
Table 7: Combining the absolute values of influences 
and changes. 
CP BP MP LP z 
SP ? ? lMP, LP] LP z 
WP ? ? ? LP z 
z z z z z z 
ble arise because the results of these combinations de­
pend upon the comparative values of o: and ,8, and the 
combination of influences and changes is thus "almost­
robust" (Dubois et al. 1992) . If we take o: � ,8 and 
1-,8 � o:, which are reasonable since typical values (to 
create equally wide intervals) would be ,8 � 0.33 and 
o: � 0.5, then we have Table 8. Results of combining 
Refining reasoning in qualitative probabilistic networks 433 
lose job 
Figure 7: Some recent events (V) 
with negative influences and changes can be obtained 
by symmetry. where intervals such as [M P, LP] in-
Table 8: Combining the absolute values of influences 
and changes with o: 2: f3 and 1 - f3 2: o:. 
CP BP MP LP z 
SP ��P, MPJ � P, MPJ ��P, L�J LP z 
WP [MP, LP] [MP, LP] [MP, LP] LP z 
z z z z z z 
dicate that the result falls somewhere in the interval 
created by the outer bounds of the named intervals. 
If we then provide for the comparison of intervals, for 
instance by 2:int (Parsons 1995b) where [a, b] 2:int 
[c , d] iff a 2: c and b 2: d,  and negation by mapping 
across zero into the symmetric interval, we can re­
solve conflicting influences. For example, consider Fig­
ure 7 in which the influences have now been given ab­
solute orders of magnitude. Consider what happens 
when it is known that I both exercise and become ill. 
Taking into account the size of the priors, we have 
�p(exercise) = M P and D.p(ill) = BP. Using Ta­
ble 8 gives D.p(stay fit) = [M P, LP] so that we can 
calculate the effect of staying fit on going to hospital as 
�p(hospital)stay fit= [[M N, LN], LN] = [M N, LN]. 
The other influence on the probability of going to 
hospital is being ill, and clearly D.p(hospital)w = 
[BP, M P]. Since i[BP, M P]i 2:int j[M N, LN]j, the 
biggest effect on the probability of going to hospital is 
being ill, and �p(hospital) = [+]. 
To resolve competing hypotheses, we need to be able 
to combine changes and prior values, and with our set 
of intervals we get Table 9. Prior values are given 
across the top, changes down the side. Again the re­
sults are almost robust, with those given based upon 
the same values of o: and f3 as before. Note that only 
certain combinations are possible; where they are not, 
the' corresponding triple of prior, change, and influence 
cannot occur together. Now, if we are given the abso­
lute value of the prior probabilities of the competing 
Table 9: Combining the absolute values of changes and 
priors. 
CP BP MP LP z 
CP CP 
BP [CP, BP] BP 
MP [CP,MP] [CP, MP] MP 
LP [CP, BP] [CP, MP) [BP, LP) LP 
z CP BP MP LP z 
LN [BP, MP) [MP, Z] [LP, Z) 
MN [BP, Z] [MP, Z) 
BN [LP, Z] 
CN 
hypotheses, we can resolve their competition. For ex­
ample, consider that the prior values of p(lose job) and 
p(hospital) are both LP, then, if �p(exercise) = M P 
and D.p(not qualified) = BP, then �p(hospital) = 
[MN,LN] and D.p(lose job) = [MP,LP]. We can 
use this information along with Table 9 to deter­
mine the posterior values p*(lose job)= [CP, LP] and 
p* (hospital) = [LP, Z] which by application of 2:int 
tells us that it is more likely that I will lose my job 
than go to hospital. 
Thus the use of absolute orders of magnitude provides 
a solution to both the problem of competing hypothe­
ses, and that of competing influences. Note that this 
method may be implemented either by the use of pre­
compiled tables as discussed here, or more flexibly and 
less efficiently by the direct use of interval arithmentic. 
6 SUMMARY 
This paper has discussed various means of refining 
qualitative probabilistic reasoning to make it less sus­
ceptible to the problems of choosing between compet­
ing hypotheses, and of predicting the effect of conflict­
ing influences. The first method we considered was the 
identification of extreme probabilities, and the cate­
gorical influences that cause such values to arise. This 
solved both problems, but only in the special case in 
which hypotheses are affected by a categorial influ­
ence. To provide more general results we used relative 
order of magnitude reasoning to give a good solution 
to the problem of conflicting influences. However, the 
relative method did not fully solve the problem of con­
flicting hypotheses, and so an absolute order of magni­
tude scheme was introduced. This gave a satisfactory 
solution to both problems. 
These different schemes provide a battery of methods 
for extending QP/CNs which can be employed when 
the basic QP/CN framework is not sufficiently expres­
sive. Clearly refining the representation will increase 
computational complexity, and the right degree of re­
finement will be determined by the particular situation 
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to which the methods are being applied. The greater 
degrees of refinement are sufficient to make QP/CNs 
similar in scope to the ��:-calculus (Darwiche & Gold­
szmidt 1994). While lack of space precludes a detailed 
comparison we can briefly point out three basic differ­
ences between the systems. Firstly, even when fully 
refined, QPfCNs are mainly concerned with changes 
in probabilities rather than probabilities themselves, 
unlike the ��:-calculus. Secondly, QP/CNs do not re­
quire the use of infinitesimals in order to be consis­
tent with probability theory, and so could be consid­
ered a more correct approach. Finally, the ��:-calculus 
achieves order-of-magnitude reasoning by defining an 
absolute scale from which different values are taken, 
in contrast to the purely relative method, based on 
ROM[K] that is introduced here. Thus, while the ��:­
calculus is very similar to the absolute order of mag­
nitude scheme introduced in Section 5, it is rather dif­
ferent to the other refinements discussed in this paper. 
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